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Abstract
This paper analyzes an economic experiment designed to measure the
effect of “legal technology” on the economic efficiency of Coasian bargain-
ing. In the experiment, the agreement of many agents (called “landowners”)
to transfer their property rights to a single agent (called “the developer”)
generates an economic surplus. In this setting, we show that a very prim-
itive legal technology sequential cash purchase (SC-P) is a strong imple-
mentation of a unique efficient bargaining outcome as a subgame-perfect
equilibrium. However, when deployed in the laboratory, SC-P results in an
average loss of 60% of the economic surplus through inefficient negotia-
tion failure. Deploying a more behaviorally robust but also more legally
complex technology, a tender and conditional offer (TC-O) mechanism,
halved the surplus loss and supported significant developer payoffs. These
results suggest that, even absent asymmetric information, moral hazard,
and transactions costs, complex legal technologies can increase bargaining
efficiency.
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1 Introduction
Under what conditions do private negotiations lead to efficient resource allocation?
A necessary condition for efficiency is the absence of negotiation-related transactions
costs. The Coase Theorem argues that this necessary condition is, in fact, sufficient.
Most objections to the Coase Theorem center on the inefficiency of even transaction-
cost free negotiations. Game-theoretic models of negotiation have shown that in the
presence of, for example, asymmetric information, equilibrium negotiation strategies
involve inefficient delay.1 In fact, even under complete information, some bargaining
mechanisms lead to inefficiency.2 However, there exist agent preferences, information
specifications, and bargaining game structures under which all subgame perfect Nash
equilibria produce efficient outcomes. We term such structures, “perfect settings.” It
seems that if the Coase Theorem ever has predictive power, it will have predictive power
in perfect settings, settings where its assumptions are satisfied and its predictions corre-
spond with the predictions of the standard solution concepts used by economic theorists.
Perfect settings are games, which, if they are deployed in actual negotiations, require
some sort of legal/institutional technology to constrain agent choices to the choices pre-
scribed by the game. The sophistication of the technology in terms of the demands
it places on verifiability and commitment can vary widely across perfect settings. Al-
though all perfect settings lead to efficiency when they are populated with idealized
rational agents playing subgame perfect strategies, whether efficiency is attained by
actual economic agents and whether the attainment of efficiency varies with the legal
technology employed is an empirical question. Since it is not possible to ensure that any
real-world negotiation satisfies the “perfect setting” assumption, the empirical analysis
of this question is, of necessity, experimental.
Our paper investigates this question. The specific economic context for our exper-
iment is designed to reproduce the bargaining problem used by Coase to exemplify
Coasian bargaining—the railroad company/farmer negotiations, in which a single agent
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(the railroad), needs to acquire rights from many counterparties (the farmers) to imple-
ment a project that generates an economic surplus. The only real difference between
our setting and Coase’s is that we have updated the names of the agents: calling the
single agent who can generate a surplus “the developer” rather than “the railroad” and
the counterparties “landowners” rather than “farmers.”
We develop this bargaining problem using two different perfect mechanisms. In
the first, which we call the sequential, cash-purchase (SC-P) mechanism, the developer
approaches landowners sequentially and, in the negotiations, offers and counteroffers
propose terms for immediate cash purchase of land by the developer. Cash purchase
does not require verification of contract conditions or verification of the outcome of
developer and/or landowner actions in previous negotiations. Cash purchase contracts
can be enforced by simple escrow accounts or by simple legal sanctions against theft
and fraud. Moreover, cash purchases do not impose any duty to perform on the contract
until the other party to the contract has performed. Thus, the cash purchase mechanism
does not require enforcement of “executory” contracts.3 Therefore, simple seriatim cash
purchase should be viable even in the most unsophisticated legal environment. In fact
Hobbes [1983, Chapt. II-X] argues that natural prudence and right reason alone would
lead parties to honor such agreements even in the absence of any state legal enforce-
ment.4
As well as relying on very simple legal technology, from a mechanism design per-
spective, the sequential cash-purchase mechanism is a “gold-standard” implementation
of efficient bargaining: it is a strong implementation of an efficient bargaining out-
come as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of a perfect information game.5 Thus,
judging SC-P by the standards of legal simplicity and unambiguous implementation,
it appears to be an ideal mechanism for ensuring efficient bargaining. However, de-
ploying the mechanism in an experimental setting quickly disabuses one of this notion.
In the experiments deploying SC-P, 60% of the surplus was lost because of inefficient
negotiation failure. Not only did negotiations frequently fail, they failed so often that
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the developer’s average gain were essentially zero. Thus, our results suggest that, under
SC-P, sequential negotiations is so inefficient that little ex ante incentive exists even to
initiate negotiations aimed at capturing surplus through property rights reallocations.
Examining the data from the SC-P experiment, we find that the generally dismal
performance of the SC-P mechanism can best be explained by the vulnerability of de-
velopers to landowners making irrational (non wealth maximizing), unpredictable re-
sponses to developer offers: Under SC-P, developer payments to landowners are sunk
at the time of sale. Thus, if the developer has bought a parcel in a previous negotia-
tion and a subsequent landowner is irrationally obdurate and refuses to sell, the surplus
is lost and the developer is saddled with the cost of the previous land purchase. This
behavioral risk lowers the developer’s continuation value in early negotiations and thus
the developer’s offers. In the experiments, average accepted developer payments to
landowners sum to 80% of the project value, exceeding the Nash equilibrium predic-
tion but leaving considerable scope for developer gains if landowner responses were
predictable. Unfortunately for the developers, actual landowner responses are a mix-
ture of best-reply responses, fairness-based even-split responses, and a large number of
apparently random responses.
Because our gold-standard (under the rational choice perspective) mechanism failed
to even approximate efficient bargaining in the laboratory, and that the failure resulted
from empirical agent behavior deviating from the rational-choice paradigm, we next
investigate the question of whether modifying the legal technology would yield a more
behaviorally robust implementation of efficient bargaining. The modified technology,
which we term the tender and conditional-offer, TC-O. This mechanism employs real-
istic institutional mechanisms for property-rights acquisitions—tender-offers and con-
ditional purchases—while, at the same time, not permitting precommitment by devel-
opers to spurn offers from “holdout” landowners. In the TC-O game, the developer
makes a tender offer for each of the parcels simultaneously to all landowners. Those
landowners (if any) who reject the tender offer, the holdouts, are then approached se-
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quentially by the developer for 1-1 negotiations in the continuation subgame. Both the
continuation offers and the tender offer are conditional purchase offers, i.e., an agreed
offer obligates the parties if and only if all other landowners also reach an agreement
with the developer.
Like the SC-P, in the TC-O, all subgame perfect Nash equilibria are efficient. Thus,
the game implements efficient bargaining and hence also represents a perfect setting.
The two features that distinguish TC-O from the SC-P are the initial simultaneous ten-
der offer and conditionality. The incorporation of a tender offer into the game design
is motivated by the fact that one equilibrium of the TC-O game features a symmet-
ric developer tender offer and produces symmetric landowner payoffs. Accepting this
symmetric offer is a best-response both for rational wealth-maximizing landowners and
landowners with preferences based on inter-landowner fairness. If the game lacked
the initial tender offer phase, no pure-strategy equilibrium would exist that produced
identical payoffs to all landowners. Sequential cash purchase (conditional) negotiations
favor landowners late (early) in the negotiation sequence. Thus, under both the SC-P
and TC-O mechanisms, sequential negotiations lead to asymmetric landowner payoffs.
The tender offer phase permits developers, who are unsure whether landowners have
expected wealth maximizing or fairness-based preferences, to make tender offers that
will be accepted by both types of landowners.
In addition, because rejections void earlier purchase agreements, replacing cash pur-
chase offers with conditional offers reduces the developer’s losses from unpredictable
offer rejections. Moreover, when offers are conditional, rational best responses for
both the developer and landowner depend only on the amount of surplus that has not
yet been committed in earlier negotiations. In contrast, under SC-P, reservation de-
mands depend on the anticipated future actions of landowners later in the negotiating
sequence. These two effects combined make the conditional sale mechanism more be-
haviorally robust to deviations from the common-knowledge-of-rationality assumption
that underpins the Nash equilibrium concept. At the same time, the TC-O game requires
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enforcement of executory contracts, is not dominance solvable, is not a game of perfect
information, and supports multiple equilibria. Thus, viewed either from the perspective
of mechanism design or the perspective of legal simplicity it appears to be dominated
by sequential cash purchase.
Nevertheless, in the experiment deploying of TC-O mechanism, bargaining effi-
ciency was substantially higher than under SC-P. On average, approximately 35% of the
surplus was lost through inefficient bargaining as opposed to 60% under SC-P. More-
over, developers, on average, captured significant gains, 25% of the surplus. Landown-
ers captured the remaining 40%. The major deviation from Nash equilibrium predicted
payoffs in the TC-O resulted from inefficient negotiation failure reducing the actual sur-
plus rather than from the division of the actual surplus deviating from the Nash predic-
tions. In fact, conditioned on an efficient solution being reached, the observed average
surplus division, 38% to the developer, was within the range of surplus allocations to
the developer, 37%–40%, that are supported by subgame perfect Nash equilibria. In-
efficient negotiation failure in the TC-O treatments resulted primarily from developer
offers below the minimum offer rationalizable by any Nash equilibria.
Our structured multi-agent bargaining experiments show that, even absent transac-
tions costs, information asymmetry, or moral hazard, bargaining is substantially less
efficient than predicted by the Coase Theorem. The degree of inefficiency is dependent
on the choice of bargaining mechanism, even when equilibrium predicted efficiency
is not. A complex but fairly realistic mechanism, which reduced the dependence of
agent payoffs on the rationality of other negotiating parties, produced much more effi-
cient outcomes than a simple perfect-information mechanism. The standard rational for
complex contracting mechanisms and legally mandated negotiation regimes is that they
overcome the obstacles to efficient contract negotiation generated by asymmetric infor-
mation, unverifiability, and moral hazard [e.g., Baron and Holmstro¨m, 1980, Berkovitch
et al., 1998]. The results in this paper suggest that such mechanisms have value even
absent these impediments and that such mechanisms might have evolved to cope with
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behavioral risks generated by non-maximizing and non-Bayesian agent behavior. ,
Related literature
This paper is related to a number of strands of economic research. One strand is ex-
perimental research on structured bargaining games (Binmore et al. [1985], Ochs and
Roth [1989]). In contrast to these papers, this paper considers negotiations which are
sequential and feature more than two negotiating parties. This focus on multiagent se-
quential negotiations ties our work to a much smaller literature on multiagent sequential
bargaining. Theoretical research in this area has analyzed a number of game forms and
contracting structures for sequential multiagent bargaining which are generally more
sophisticated than our simple framework.6 Experimental research on multiagent bar-
gaining games is also limited. However, Collins and Isaac [2012] in a laboratory exper-
iments show that the holdout problem can produce large inefficiencies and lost oppor-
tunities. They also show that contingent contracts can facilitate successful bargaining
but, in contrast to our results, conditional contracting does not benefit buyers.
While the methods and approach employed in this paper are most closely tied to
the experimental literature on structured bargaining, our research objectives are more
closely linked to research on the validity of the Coase Theorem. Kahneman et al.
[1990] experimentally test the “endowment effect” on the Coase Theorem. Hoffman
and Spitzer [1982] consider 2 and 3-person unstructured full and limited information
bargaining games and find that their results support the Coase Theorem. The key dif-
ference between their paper and ours is that Hoffman and Spitzer assume that all agents
must negotiate a collective agreement. In our setting this assumption is equivalent to the
developer committing not to negotiate with holdout landowners. Hoffman and Spitzer’s
experiment thus models bargaining when some sort of collective negotiation constraint
is imposed on the bargaining agents, as in, e.g., bankruptcy negotiations under Chapter
11. Our framework, in contrast, more closely tracks free-form negotiations where there
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is no mechanism to enforce collective negotiation.7
2 Mechanisms: Sequential Cash Purchase (SC-P)
2.1 The rules of the game
We implemented a game in which a developer attempts to buy n indivisible and identi-
cal parcels of land to complete a development project. Each parcel is owned by a single
landowner. We normalize the value of a parcel to the landowner to 0. All n parcels are
required to complete the project and, if the project is not completed, the land has no
value to the developer. If all n parcels are acquired by the developer, then the value of
the project to the developer is 1 dollar. Thus, the n parcels of land are perfect comple-
ments and the economic surplus from the project is 1 dollar. The developer negotiates
with each individual landowner only once and only through 1-1 bargaining. These ne-
gotiations relate to the size of the monetary payment the developer will make for a
landowner’s parcel. The developer and landowner have complete information regard-
ing the history of the game. The developer is wealth unconstrained in that regardless of
payments he has made in the past, he can still make any payment he chooses in current
negotiations. In our experiment. We implemented the n = 3 case which correspond to
three 1-1 negotiations between a landowner and developer.
Each individual 1-1 negotiation is a two-period nonstationary version of an Osborne
and Rubinstein [1990] bargaining game, where the delay associated with the rejection
of each offer leads to a probability of value dissipation. When value dissipation oc-
curs, the economic value of project falls to zero, terminating all negotiations between
the developer and the landowners. Rejection of the first offer (made by the developer)
engenders dissipation with probability 23 ; rejection of the second offer (the counterof-
fer made by the landowner) engenders dissipation with probability 1. This bargaining
model reduces the individual 1-1 negotiation to a simple two-stage process in which the
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developer makes a initial offer, and a landowner makes the final counteroffer.
The specific structure of the model is as follows. First, the developer makes an
“offer” to a landowner to buy her land. An offer is defined in our analysis as a pay-
ment proposed by the developer to a landowner. If the landowner accepts the offer,
she receives the offer price and the negotiation with her ends. If she rejects the offer,
there is a probability 23 that the value of the project is dissipated. With probability
1
3 ,
no value dissipation occurs. In this case, the landowner makes a “counteroffer” to the
developer. A counteroffer is payment from the developer to the landowner proposed by
the landowner. At this point, the developer can accept or reject the counteroffer. If the
counteroffer is accepted, the developer acquires the parcel, makes the payment, and the
negotiation with the given landowner ends. If the counteroffer is rejected, the value of
the project falls to zero with probability 1.
2.2 Subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium
Suppose that all agents are rational risk-neutral expected payoff maximizers. All pay-
outs made by the developer in previous negotiation are sunk, and thus will be ignored
in our analysis of subsequent negotiations. Hence, when we refer to “developer pay-
offs” in a given negotiation, we are not factoring in sunk payments made in previous
negotiations. Sometimes, when we want to emphasize that sunk payments are not in-
cluded in the payoff calculation, we shall refer to developer payoffs as “continuation
payoffs.” When we want to factor these sunk payments into our analysis, we shall use
the term “total payoffs.” Our negotiation game has a unique subgame perfect equilib-
rium, derived by backward induction. Consider first the last landowner in the negotia-
tion sequence. To reach the last negotiation, the other landowners must have sold to the
developer. Thus, the last landowner knows that if she refuses to sell, the developer can-
not complete the project. If the landowner makes a counteroffer, she can demand any
amount less than the full project value 1, with the assurance that her counteroffer will
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be accepted. An offer more than 1 would certainly be rejected by the developer because
accepting such an offer produces a negative payoff to him, and he can receive a payoff
of 0 in the last negotiation simply by rejecting the counteroffer. Since the landowner
receives nothing when her offer is rejected, she will never ask for more than 1. Thus, the
landowner must receive 1 in a subgame starting with the landowner making a counterof-
fer. Hence, when the third landowner rejects a developer offer, with probability 23 , the
project’s value is dissipated, and with probability 13 the landowner makes a counteroffer
of 1, which is accepted by the developer. The expected value to the last landowner from
following the strategy of rejecting the developer’s offer is thus 13 . Rationality dictates
that the last landowner will accept any offer that is greater than 13 . The developer’s pay-
off from making an offer that is rejected is zero. Thus, an offer less than 13 will, if it is
accepted by the landowner, produce a lower payoff than a rejected offer, and thus such
an offer must be rejected. Since the developer always prefers his offer being accepted to
being rejected, the developer must, in any subgame perfect equilibrium, make an offer
of 13 to the last landowner, and this offer must be accepted.
Hence, regardless of the amount paid to landowners of earlier successful negotia-
tions, the developer knows that he will pay 13 to buy out the last landowner. Meeting
the last landowner’s demands costs the developer 13 , leaving 1− 13 = 23 available for
division between the developer and the second-to-last landowner. We call the value of
the project not committed to landowners later in the negotiation sequence the “resid-
ual value” of the project. Through the same arguments used for the last negotiation,
we can see that in the second-to-last negotiation, the landowner can capture 13 of the
residual value, i.e., 13(1− 13) = 29 . This implies that at the start of the first negotiation in
the three-landowner game, the residual value is 1− 13 − 29 = 49 . By the same argument
again, the first landowner can capture one third of this residual value, or 427 . Thus, in
any subgame perfect equilibrium, the developer’s offer is accepted in each negotiation,
and the developer offers 427 to the first landowner,
2
9 to the second landowner, and
1
3 to
the third landowner. These offers are the lowest offers the landowners will accept. If
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the developer’s offer were to be rejected, the landowner should counter with an offer
equal to three times the developer’s offer, and the developer should accept this final
offer if and only if the developer’s payoff from this point is non-negative. These simple
arguments motivate the following result.
Proposition 1. Let ei represent the landowner counteroffer when the landowner is the
ith landowner approached by the developer; let oi be the offer the developer makes
the ith landowner approached by the developer. The unique subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of the game is given by
1. Developer offers, oi are given by o∗1 =
4
27 ,o
∗
2 =
2
9 ,o
∗
3 =
1
3 .
2. Landowner’s reject all developer offers less than o∗i and accept all offers greater
than or equal to o∗i
3. Landowner counteroffers, ci are given by c∗1 = 1−o∗2−o∗3,c∗2 = 1−o∗3,c∗3 = 1.
4. Developers reject all developer offers greater than c∗i and accept all offers less
than or equal to c∗i
Moreover, this equilibrium is the dominance solvable solution to the game and the total
payoff to the developer and all the landowners equals 1, the total surplus generated by
the property-rights transfer.
Proof. A formal derivation of this proposition is provided by Online Supplement A.
3 Mechanism: Tender and Conditional Offer (TC-O)
3.1 Rules of the game
The assumptions concerning agent valuations and preferences are the same in the TC-O
game as in the SC-P game. Also, as in the sequential unconditional game, the individual
1-1 negotiation are a two-period nonstationary version of an Osborne and Rubinstein
[1990] bargaining game.
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There are two key differences between the sequential unconditional game and the
conditional offer game. First, under the conditional offer game, the developer’s offers
are conditional. Developer offers and landowner counteroffers stipulate an amount that
the developer will pay the landowner conditioned on all landowners reaching agree-
ments with the developer. If an agreement is not reached with any one landowner, the
developer is not obligated to pay any payments to the landowners. The second differ-
ence is that, at the start of the game, the developer makes a simultaneous tender offer to
all landowners. The tender offer consists of n offers, one for each of the n landowners.
These n offers need not to be identical. Rejection of the tender offer never leads to dissi-
pation. If a landowner accepts the tender offer, this offer fixes the landowner’s contract
with the developer and the landowner “exits” the game. We call the set of landowners
who reject the developer’s tender offer the holdout set and the set of landowners who
accept the developer’s offer the acceptor set. If the holdout set is empty, the game ends
after the initial tender offer phase and value is divided as specified by the conditional
offer contracts.
If the holdout set is not empty then, the game proceeds. The developer picks a
holdout landowner with whom he will enter into 1-1 negotiations. The 1-1 negotiations
follow the pattern described above. This process continues with further 1-1 negotia-
tions until either dissipation occurs, in which case all parties receive a zero payoff or
contracts are fixed with all landowners, in which case, the conditional contracts divide
the surplus, 1, among the landowners and developer. Thus, the game can be divided into
two phases: the initial tender offer phase that consists of the developer’s tender offer
and the landowner responses and a sequential continuation phase where the developer
sequentially approaches those landowners who did not agree to the tender offer for se-
quential 1-1 negotiations. We solve the game by working backwards, starting with the
sequential continuation phase.
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3.2 Subgame perfect Nash equilibria
3.2.1 Sequential continuation phase
The strategies of the developer and landowners in the sequential continuation phase are
transparent. We will first verify in any subgame perfect equilibrium in which, in each
sequential 1-1 negotiation, the developer offers the landowner 13 r, where r represent
the residual value available at the start of the given 1-1 negotiation. The residual value
is the surplus from the project, 1, less the value committed to landowners in either the
initial tender offer phase or earlier 1-1 negotiations.
Consider first the developer’s response to landowner counteroffers in a given 1-1 ne-
gotiation. Because, rejection of the counteroffer triggers dissipation with certainty, the
developer’s payoff from rejecting a counteroffer is zero. The developer’s payoff from
accepting counteroffers less than or equal to residual value is always non-negative. The
developer’s payoff from accepting counteroffers greater than residual value are always
negative. Thus, a developer reservation strategy of accepting all counteroffers demands
less than or equal to residual value and rejecting all offer in excess of residual value
is a best response for the developer. Landowners earn nothing if they make an offer
that will be rejected. So given the developer’s counteroffer response strategy, a coun-
teroffer demanding the entire residual value, r, is an optimal strategy for landowners.
Since reaching the counteroffer stage in the 1-1 negotiations triggers dissipation with
probability 23 . A reservation response strategy for the landowner of accepting developer
offers if and only if they are at least equal 13 r is a best accept/reject response strategy
for landowners. Given that the developer earns zero payoffs from rejected offers, the
optimal offer for the developer in the given 1-1 negotiation is to offer the landowner
1
3 r. Under the landowner’s response, this offer will be accepted. Thus, in each of the
1-1 negotiation in the sequential continuation phase the developer will offer and the
landowner will accept 13 r.
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3.2.2 Landowner and developer payoffs from the sequential continuation phase
The actual offers made in the continuation phase depend on the residual value remain-
ing after the initial tender offer phase and the number of holdout landowners. Let h
represent the number of holdout landowners. Let ro be the residual value at the start
of the sequential continuation phase, i.e., ro equals the surplus less value committed
to the landowners who have accepted initial tender offers. Then the offer to the first
landowner in the sequential phase is 13 ro, and the residual value after this negotiation
is 23 ro. Since the developer always offers
1
3 of the residual value to the next landowner
and this offer would be accepted in the equilibrium, the payoff to the developer in the
sequential continuation phase is thus given by
ΠD(h,ro) =
(2
3
)h
ro. (1)
Although the sequence in which the developer approaches landowners has no ef-
fect on the developer’s equilibrium payoff or the total payoff to landowners, sequencing
does affect the payoffs to individual landowners. Equilibrium offers are declining in
the landowner’s position in the negotiation sequence. Thus, in contrast to the simple
unconditional sequential SC-P game, landowners late in the sequence of negotiations
receive smaller payoffs than those receiving early offers. This follows from condition-
ality: the more offers accepted, the smaller the residual value a landowner can extract
by rejecting the developer’s offer and making a counteroffer. The late position in the
sequential negotiations lowers the landowner’s reservation demands and thus, the de-
veloper’s offer.
Because the game is symmetric, there is no reason for any landowner to expect any
particular sequence of developer offers. Moreover, the developer is indifferent across
negotiation sequences. For these reasons, we restrict attention to equilibria in which
the developer follows a symmetric sequencing strategy, selecting the next landowner to
be approached in 1-1 negotiations by randomizing uniformly over all of the remaining
holdout landowners. Under this assumption, when there are h holdouts, each landowner
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expects to be the tth landowner approached with probability 1/h. Thus, the expected
payoff to a landowner, ΠL, in the continuation phase given that ro residual value re-
maining after the initial tender offer phase and h landowners holding out is given by
averaging over the total value to holdout landowners.
ΠL(h,ro) =
1
h
(
1− (23)h) ro. (2)
We record the results of this analysis in the next lemma.
Lemma 1. In the continuation phase, if the residual value after the completion of the
initial tender offer phase is ro and there are h holdout landowners remaining, then in
any subgame perfect equilibrium in undominated strategies, the developer’s payoff is
given by equation (1) and the payoff to each holdout landowner is given by equation (2).
3.2.3 The initial tender offer phase
The analysis of the initial tender offer phase is substantially more complex than the
analysis of the continuation phase. Complexity is introduced by simultaneous nature
of the tender offer. Each landowner’s best response to the developer’s offer depends
on the response of the other landowners. This dependence leads to multiple equilibria.
Fortunately, as we shall show, the equilibrium payoffs in these equilibria are confined
to a very narrow range. Because the formal analysis of these equilibria is somewhat
involved and the payoff and response predictions are very similar across the equilibria,
we defer the technical development of the results to Online Supplement B. Here we
only summarize the logic.
A Nash equilibrium in the initial tender offer phase is a tender offer vector for the
developer, α , and a response function for the landowners. The landowners’ response
function is an accept/reject decision associated with each developer offer. The tender
offer and response function constitute a Nash equilibrium if the developer’s offer max-
imizes the developer’s payoff given the landowner response function and, for each de-
veloper offer, the landowners’ response functions are best responses given the response
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functions of the other landowners. Because, in equilibrium, all negotiations succeed
in the continuation phase, the payoff to a landowner from accepting the tender offer is
simply the tender offer of the developer. The payoff to the landowner from rejecting the
offer is the equilibrium payoff to the landowner from being a holdout in the continua-
tion phase conditioned on the other landowners’ responses to the offer. The equilibrium
payoff to the developer and the equilibrium payoff to the landowner from holding out
are defined by the subgame perfect equilibrium in undominated strategies presented in
Lemma 1.
The dependence of landowner best responses on the response of other landowners is
illustrated by the following example. Consider a developer offer of 15 to each landowner
(i.e., α =
(1
5 ,
1
5 ,
1
5
)
). If the other landowners are following a strategy of accepting this
offer, then a given landowner, say landowner 1, will receive a payoff of 15 if she ac-
cepts the offer. If she holds out she expects to be the lone holdout, h = 1, and expects
residual value to equal 1−2 × 15 = 35 . From equation (2) we see that her holdout pay-
off, ΠL(h = 1,ro = 35) equals
1
5 . So under the conjecture that other landowners will
accept, acceptance is a best response for landowner 1. Now consider the same offer,
α =
(1
5 ,
1
5 ,
1
5
)
but assume that landowner 1 believes that the other landowners will re-
ject the offer. In this case landowner 1’s payoff from rejection is the payoff associated
with three holdout landowners (h = 3) and a residual value of 1. Again computing the
landowner’s payoff from rejection using (2), for h = 3 and ro = 1 we see that her re-
jection payoff equals 1981 >
1
5 , thus rejection is a best response for the landowner. In
general, unless accepted developer offers are very small, the gain from holding out is
increasing in the number of holdouts. This effect leads to multiple equilibria.
However, the range of payoffs that can be supported by multiple equilibria is fairly
limited because the developer can make an offer that “forces” each landowner to conjec-
ture that the others will accept. The forcing offer is structured as follows. Let max(α)
represent the highest developer offer to any landowner, mid(α) the middle offer and
min(α) the lowest offer. Call the landowner receiving the max(α) (mid(α),min(α))
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offer the max (mid, min) landowner. The forcing offer fixes max(α) just high enough
so that accepting the offer is a best response for the max landowner regardless of the
accept/reject decisions of the other landowners. We call the offer that meets this condi-
tion α+. If α+ is offered to the max landowner, then the mid landowner must, in any
equilibrium, conjecture that the max landowner will accept. This lowers the reservation
demands the mid landowner and the developer can then fix the offer to mid landowner
so that the mid landowner is just willing to accept regardless of the accept/reject deci-
sion of the min landowner. We call this offer αo. In which case, the min landowner
must in any equilibrium conjecture that the max and mid landowners will accept, low-
ering the min landowner’s reservation demands. The developer can then fix the min
offer so that the min landowner is just willing to accept. We call this offer, α−. Value in
excess of these offers, 1−(α++αo+α−) places a floor on developer payoffs and ceil-
ing on landowner payoffs. Similarly, the offer α =
(1
5 ,
1
5 ,
1
5
)
produces the lowest total
payments to the landowners over offers that all landowners will accept given all other
landowners accept. Thus the offer α =
(1
5 ,
1
5 ,
1
5
)
places a ceiling on developer payoffs
and a floor on landowner payoffs. The ceiling and floor are quite close. Moreover, any
division of value between the ceiling and floor can be supported by a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium and no division of value that is not between the ceiling and floor can
be supported by a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. This result is recorded below. It
is also possible derive bounds on rationalizable developer offers. Tender offers outside
these bounds cannot be part of any rationalizable solution of the game, i.e., any solution
to the game where agents conjecture that other agents play best responses conditioned
on consistent beliefs, beliefs that are self-fulfilling in the sense that under the conjec-
tured beliefs the conjectured actions of other agents are best replies for those agents.
In contrast to the Nash solution concept, rationalizability only imposes the condition
that agent rationality is common knowledge while the Nash solution requires that the
Nash equilibrium itself is common knowledge, i.e, in a rationalizable solution, agents
can hold different consistent conjectures regarding the actions of other agents. Since we
Goswami
18
only use these bounds in one of our experimental tests and the bounds, in fact, have little
predictive power, we defer their development to Lemma B.2 in Online Supplement B.
Proposition 2. Let
α+ =ΠL[3,1] = 1981 , α
o =ΠL[2,1−α+] = 155729 , α− =ΠL[1,1−α+−αo] = 4032187 ,
D− = 1−α+−αo−α− = 8062187 ≈ 0.368541, D+ = 25 = 0.40.
Then
(a) for all D ∈ [D−,D+] there exists a Nash equilibrium of the conditional offer game
that produces developer payoff equal to D and landowner payoffs equal to 1−D.
(b) All subgame perfect equilibrium the game produces developer payoffs between D+
and D−.
Proof. See Online Supplement B for proof of this proposition and see Lemma B.2 for
the explicit conditions that a rationalizable offer must satisfy.
4 Behavioral solutions
Before we investigate the experimental results, we considerer some obvious behavioral
biases that might influence agent behavior and induce deviations from rational Nash
best replies. Under the SC-P mechanism, off the equilibrium path, the developer’s
equilibrium strategy calls for the developer to accept offers that generate negative total
payoffs. Such acceptances are rational because payments to landowners reached earlier
in the negotiation sequence are sunk and thus do not figure in a rational developers ac-
cept/reject decision. A rational developer will fix his reservation response to landowner
counteroffers to that he accepts all offers that produce positive continuation payoff. To-
tal payoffs are not decision relevant. However, the literature has documented that actual
economic agents frequently exhibit sunk-cost bias, and factor sunk costs into their deci-
sions. Because landowners only negotiate once with the developer and the developer’s
reservation value only factors into the developer’s response to landowner counteroffers,
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sunk cost bias can directly affect the developer’s response to landowner counteroffers.
However, if the bias is common knowledge, it will affect the landowner’s counteroffer
and thus also the developer’s offers through its effect on the developer’s reservation
response to final offers. Thus, for the SC-P mechanism we consider the sunk-cost so-
lution. Under the TC-O mechanism, equilibrium strategies never call for the developer
to accept offers that generate negative total payoffs for the simple reason that offer con-
ditionality implies that total payoffs equal continuation payoffs and accepting offers
generating negative continuation payoffs is never a rational best reply for the developer.
Thus, under this mechanism sunk-cost bias is moot.
Under both mechanisms, fairness norms might affect agent behavior. In fact, “split-
the-difference” divisions of gains exhibit considerable predictive power in laboratory
experiments [Roth and Malouf, 1979], even in experiments that set up a strategic bar-
gaining game which has a Nash equilibrium solution inconsistent with the even-split
solution (see Binmore et al. [1985]). For this reason, in our reports on the outcomes of
both mechanisms, we shall frequently compare outcomes with the even split solution.
In the case of the TC-O mechanism, with induces a simultaneous tender offer to all
landowners, another focus for fairness norms is the symmetry of offers to the landown-
ers. Thus, when discussing the TC-O mechanism we will sometimes focus our analysis
on the effect of tender-offer symmetry.
4.1 Sunk-cost solution: SC-P
If developers ignore the fact that payments in earlier negotiations are sunk, they may
set their reservation demands in the final offer stage at a level which insures that their
total payoff is non-negative rather than the rational reservation level, which ensures
that their continuation payoff is non-negative. We term the solution to the game under
this assumption the sunk-cost solution. In the behavioral sunk-cost solution we assume
that landowner reservation demands depend only on their position in the negotiation
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sequence and not on earlier offers of other landowners.
In this case, assuming that the developer’s sunk cost bias is common knowledge,
and otherwise agents are risk-neutral rational value maximizers, the counteroffer by
each landowner must push the developer’s payoff to the sunk-cost rejection threshold.
Because landowners observe the payments made in previous negotiations, their com-
putation of the developer’s zero total payoff threshold is simple. Rational expectation
requires that the developer’s actual earlier offer be the same as the offer conjectured by
the landowner. Moreover, for exactly the same reasons as we outlined in the analysis of
the rational Nash solution, the developer’s offer must equal one third of the landowner’s
counteroffer. Thus, if we let ci represent the equilibrium counteroffer of landowner i,
i= 1,2,3 and oi represents the developer’s equilibrium offer to landowner i, we see that
offers and counteroffers must satisfy the following system of equations:
∑ j 6=i o j+ ci = 1, i= 1,2,3,
oi = 13 ci, i= 1,2,3.
This system of equations has a unique solution: oi = 15 , i = 1,2,3; ci =
3
5 , i = 1,2,3.
Thus, using the same logic as applied to the rational value maximizing equilibrium,
one can show that under the sunk cost solution agents follow the following strategies:
the developer’s offer is accepted in each negotiation and the developer offers 15 to all
landowners. This offer is the lowest offer the landowners will accept. If the developer’s
offer were to be rejected, the landowner should counter with an offer equal to 35 , and
the developer should accept this counteroffer if and only if it is less than or equal to
3
5 . Landowners believe, regardless of the offer they receive from the developer, that
the developer has paid 15 to each landowner with whom he has previously negotiated.
Other perfect Bayesian equilibria may exist under the sunk-cost assumption. In these
more complex equilibria, landowner beliefs about earlier negotiations are affected by
the developer’s offer. And for reasons similar to those documented in McAfee and
Schwartz [1994], dissipation may occur. However, given symmetry and simplicity of
our sunk-cost solution, we believe that it is a natural solution when otherwise rational
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developer suffer from a sunk cost bias that leads him to avoid at all cost accepting offers
that produce negative total payoffs.
4.2 Even-split solution: SC-P and TC-O
Under the assumption that agents demand fair payments and make fair offers, with
“fair” being defined by the even division of the surplus from the project, we expect the
developer’s offer to be accepted in each negotiation and the developer to offer 1n+1 to
each landowner, while n is the number of landowners in the negotiation. This offer is the
lowest offers the landowners will accept. If the developer’s offer were to be rejected, the
landowner should counter with an offer equal to 1n+1 and the developer should accept a
final offer if and only if it is less than or equal to this counteroffer.
5 The design of the experiment
In the baseline experiment we set the number of landowner, n, equal to three. However,
we also performed some experiments with one and two landowners as a robustness
check. The results of these experiments are reported in the Online Supplement. Subjects
for the experiment were recruited at a private university on the East Coast from a pool of
undergraduate and graduate business students.8 Each student participated only in one
experiment. The likelihood of contact between subjects in different experiments was
minimized by recruiting students in different campuses, levels, and programs.
For each SC-P experimental session, we recruited up to 14 participants to play
the two roles in the experiment, developer and landowner. We varied the number of
landowners in each game as follows: For each SC-P experimental session, we re-
cruited up to 14 participants to play the two roles in the experiment, developer and
landowner. We varied the number of landowners in each game as follows: Game A
with 1 landowner, Game B with 2 landowners and Game C with 3 landowners. 14
students were recruited to increase the likelihood that at least 12 students would show
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up. Since we needed either 1, 2 or 3 subjects to form one group of landowners and one
developer, we decided to play each game with 12 subjects. For the TC-O session, we re-
cruited 16 participants. The number of actual subjects is shown in Table 1. When there
were one or two participants in excess of required number of subjects, we “hired” the
excess participants as assistants and paid them the average subject payoff. In each ses-
sion, the subjects were taken into a classroom and provided with the instruction sheet,
a decision tree and a consent form. First, the instruction sheet was read aloud. Next,
subject questions were answered by the experimenter. Then the participants were asked
to sign the consent form. After signing the consent forms, the subjects were taken into
an experimental laboratory with 18 independent terminals, 4 in each row and 2 on one
side. One terminal on the side was used as the experimenter’s terminal. This terminal
could observe all decisions taken by subjects at any point in time. The subjects are
requested to write the terminal number on their result sheet.9
<<COMP: Place Table 1 about here>>
The subjects were told that there would be no verbal discussions between the sub-
jects but questions would be answered by one of the experimenters during four practice
rounds. All negotiations were conducted by entering numbers on computer terminals.
In SC-P sessions, as soon as the subjects were seated on a terminal and experimenter
decided to play the A or B or C type game, 6, 4 or 3 of the 12 subjects were randomly
designated to be the developers. Then the rest of the subjects were randomly divided
in 6 or 4 or 3 groups and in each group subjects were designated as landowner 1, 2, or
3. In the next round, the computer picked 6 or 4 or 3 developers from the earlier round
landowners and continued to do so until all subjects are designated as developer once.
The designation of developer and landowner as well as the formation of group changed
from round to round throughout the experiment. Each experiment therefore, is equiv-
alent to an independent game. But the developer’s role was carefully allocated so that
each subject played developer’s role the same number of times. Developer total payoffs
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could be negative. However, landowner payoffs could never be negative. Because all
subjects played the developer and landowner role an equal number of times, we were
not required to pay a base payoff to subjects to avoid subjects receiving a negative total
payoff in the experiment. We announced that experiment session might continue up to
20 rounds. However, subjects essentially played the game with indefinite end points
since they were not told when the game would end. In TC-O session, the process is
similar and all games have one developer and three landowners.
Landowners could observe the negotiations with other landowners on the computer
terminal. Payoffs in the experiment where determined by setting the value of the parcel
at 100 Francs, the experimental currency unit. Landowner payoffs equaled payments
to the landowner by the developer and developer payoffs equaled 100 Francs less pay-
ments to the landowners if the negotiations succeeded and zero less payments to the
landowners if negotiations failed. Each landowner and developer kept records of offers
and counteroffers. The overall result of the round was shown to all the landowners and
developers at the end of each round. Each experiment was repeated for several rounds,
and each experiment session lasted less than one hour. At the end of each session, pay-
offs were calculated and payments were made to all subjects in less than 5 minutes. The
total payoff to all participants was $1900 for 5 sets of experimental session and 3 ses-
sions of trial runs. Individual subject’s dollar payoffs were determined by multiplying
that subject’s Franc payoff by the conversion factor 0.0625. The average dollar payoff
to subjects was $23.69 for about one hour of their time.
6 Outcomes of the SC-P game
6.1 Basic results
We only report SC-P games with one developer negotiating with three landowners.
Table 2 describes the incidence of failure in the negotiations. The most striking result
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in this table that 59% of negotiation ended in failure. These results are inconsistent with
the Coase Theorem and with the predictions of the standard game theoretic models of
behavior because, under the unique rational Nash outcome, the likelihood of negotiation
failure is zero.
<<COMP: Place Table 2 about here>>
Table 3 continues our investigation by considering the realized payoffs of the play-
ers. Total payoffs and the payoffs of each agent are below rational Nash predicted
values. The shortfall is particularly pronounced for the developers: the average devel-
oper payoff is essentially 0. Inspecting agent payoffs conditioned on offer success, we
see that the average developer’s payoff is higher and but still less than the theoretically
predicted payoff. In fact, developer payoffs, on average, are closer to the even-split
solution which divides the surplus equally between all of the players, than the predicted
Nash payoff. These very low average payoffs to the developer seem to be the prod-
uct of frequent breakdown in negotiations and, to a lesser extent, excessively generous
developer offers.
<<COMP: Place Table 3 about here>>
Frequent negotiation failures leading to dissipation in experimental simulation of
structured bargaining games which support only efficient subgame perfect equilibria
are not uncommon. As reported in the online supplement, for robustness treatments
featuring a single landowner, rate of failure (about 31%), as well as the propensity of
subjects to make disadvantageous counteroffers and make even-split offers, was roughly
consistent with the literature (see Ochs and Roth [1989]). However, in our multi-agent
negotiation framework, failure has different consequences for agent payoffs than it does
in single negotiation games. Because developer makes unconditional payments to the
landowners, landowners who have reached agreements with the developer receive posi-
tive payoffs even when the negotiations fail at a later point in the negotiation sequence.
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So failure disproportionally affects those landowners later in the negotiation sequence.
Because the developer cannot receive any gain unless all negotiations are successfully
completed, failure’s effect on the developer is even greater. The disproportionate ef-
fect of failure perhaps accounts both for the first landowner in the negotiation sequence
having the highest average payoff as well as the insignificance of average developer
payoffs.
Next, we consider the most obvious candidate for producing offer failures: inade-
quate developer offers. Table 4 provides a summary of the tender offers by developers.
From Table 4, we see that a majority of developer offers fall between the even split
solution and the rational Nash solution. However, as predicted by the rational Nash
solution, offers are higher in later rounds of negotiations, 0.218, 0.266, and 0.274, re-
spectively. The average offer of 0.218 in the first negotiations is much higher than the
rational solution of 0.148 but lower than the even-split solution of 0.25. The offer equals
or exceeds the even-split offer around 45% of the time. Moreover, over 85% of the time,
the first offer exceeds the Nash predicted offer. Thus, relative to the Nash prediction de-
veloper offers are unaggressive. For the second and third rounds, the average offers by
the developer trend up but only to a level slightly above the even-split solution. In the
third and last negotiation, the average offer is just slightly above the even-split solution,
while 97% of offers are below the rational Nash prediction. Note that in the last ne-
gotiation, previous negotiations payoffs are sunk, and there are at most two remaining
moves for each of the players. Thus, in the very subgame where the predictive failure
of the rational Nash solution is most pronounced, the backward induction required to
solve the game is the simplest. Thus, a simple failure of backward induction and it-
erated dominance to predict subject strategies in multistage games, as documented by
Ochs and Roth [1989] and McKelvey and Palfrey [1992], cannot completely explain
the divergence between the rational Nash predictions and our results.
<<COMP: Place Table 4 about here>>
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Having completed our analysis of developer offers, we turn to landowner responses.
Our analysis of these responses is initiated in Table 5. In this table, we consider the
proportion of offer acceptances and rejections consistent with the predictions of both the
Nash and even-split solutions. In the table, NA represents the proportion of offers that
are acceptable for the given solution of the game; PA represents the fraction of offers
which should be accepted based on the given solution that are actually accepted; and
PR represents the fraction of offers which should be rejected that are actually rejected.
Perfect predicted success of the equilibrium requires that both PA and PR equal 1.
We see from Table 5 that the even-split offer is accepted roughly 80% of the time in
all rounds. It appears that landowners recognize that they are in stronger bargaining
positions in later rounds, and they are less likely to accept even-split offers. On the
other hand, there is no clear threshold for offer rejection. Offers below rational offer
or even-split offer are not consistently rejected. Thus, in the experiments, developers
faced a great deal of uncertainty regarding the landowners’ reservation demands.
<<COMP: Place Table 5 about here>>
Next we turn, in Table 6, to consider landowner counteroffers. Each solution to the
bargaining game we consider specifies a counteroffer. However, in all solutions, this
counteroffer is off the equilibrium path. Thus, our first interesting observation is that,
contrary to our theoretical predictions, counteroffers are frequently observed, occurring
in 20 of the 172 negotiations. The second observation is that such counteroffers are low
relative to the preceding developer offer. Because a rejected developer offer triggers a 23
chance of dissipation, any landowner strategy that involves rejecting a given developer
offer and countering with an offer less than thrice the rejected offer is weakly dominated
by an otherwise identical strategy of accepting the offer. We call such rejections and
counteroffers “weakly disadvantageous.” We find that, overall, 95% of all counteroffers
are weakly disadvantageous. As with the developer offers, counteroffers increase with
the number of previous negotiations. This increase is consistent with theoretical pre-
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diction of the rational Nash solution. However, the magnitude of the increase is far less
than predicted. In fact, the average level of the counteroffer is between the sunk-cost
prediction and the even-split prediction, with the sunk-cost model having slightly better
predictive power in the last two negotiations and the even-split having higher predic-
tive power in the first negotiation. The divergence from the rational Nash prediction is
particularly striking in the last negotiation. The subgame starting with the landowner’s
counteroffer in the last negotiation is a simple ultimatum game. The mean landowner
demand of 0.476 is not only less than the rational value maximizing prediction, 1.00, it
is also much less aggressive than the typical ultimatum games offers.10 Binmore et al.
[1985] also find that embedding an ultimatum game in a larger game can change subject
play in the ultimatum game. However, in their case, embedding increases the degree
to which subject behavior fits the rational wealth-maximizing strategic model. In our
case, embedding the ultimatum game leads to greater deviation from this model.
<<COMP: Place Table 6 about here>>
In the second and third negotiations, counteroffers also seem low relative to the pay-
off landowners should be able to extract given the average payoffs to other landowners.
Recall that a developer, even one suffering from a sunk-cost bias, should always accept
any offer from the landowner that leaves his total payoff positive. The average payoff
to a landowner in any negotiation is less than 0.20. Thus, any demand of 0.60 by the
landowner in the first negotiation, should be accepted by the developer if he believes
that the subsequent pattern of negotiation will produce payoffs to the next two landown-
ers consistent with the average payoffs in the experiment. Yet, landowner counteroffers
of 0.60 and above are almost never observed in the experiment. In short, counterof-
fers seem very unaggressive, especially when contrasted with landowners’ aggressive
rejection of developer offers. The unaggressive behavior of the landowners lowers the
cost to developers of having their offers rejected, and thus increases developer prof-
its. In the first negotiation however counteroffers were aggressive relative to the Nash
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prediction and in fact all counteroffers were more than the rational Nash solution and
less than the sunk cost solution. Given the fairly aggressive pattern of counteroffers
in the first negotiation, and subsequent landowner behavior, it is reasonable to conjec-
ture that landowner estimates of payments the developer would make to landowners in
subsequent negotiations (which should fix the developer’s acceptance threshold in the
first negotiation) were less than the payments predicted by the subgame perfect Nash
solution.
Finally, we consider developer responses to counteroffers in Table 7, which is struc-
turally identical to Table 5. From the table, we see that in the final round of negotiations
all offers were accepted. Because these offers were all less than the sunk cost predicted
offer of 0.50, and a fortiori less than the rational Nash offer 1.0, it is not possible to
determine from the data how developers might have responded to a final offer of say
0.60, which would be close to the typical ultimatum in an ultimatum game played for
1.00 value. Given that such offers were not even attempted, it seems reasonable to
conclude that landowners believed that developers would be unwilling to accept such
offers. When we turn to the second negotiation, we see that developers are quite ag-
gressive in rejecting counteroffers of more than 0.50, the optimal rejection threshold in
both the sunk cost and rational Nash solutions, rejecting such offers 43% of the time.
However, developers were willing to accept counteroffers in excess of the even split
solution, as can be seen from the fact that mean accepted landowner counteroffer is
0.305. Landowner offers are accepted 50% of the time, with the mean rejected offer
equaling 0.339. In short, developers seem willing to grant the landowners, who possess
all the bargaining power when making a counteroffer, payoffs in excess of the even split
solution but are unwilling to allow a single landowner to capture more than half of the
gains from an agreement.
<<COMP: Place Table 7 about here>>
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6.2 Potential explanations for results
The game played by experimental subjects is modeled as a game of complete and per-
fect information. Thus, assuming common knowledge among the players that all play-
ers will follow rational value-maximizing strategies, there is no incentive for the sub-
jects to engage in dissipative reputation formation, i.e., to attempt to use proposals or
rejections to change the beliefs of the parties with whom they are negotiating. Only
in asymmetric information bargaining games do equilibrium solutions typically feature
dissipative signaling or reputation formation (see, for example, Grossman and Perry
[1986]). However, a number of experimental researchers have pointed out that common
knowledge of rationality may be lacking in experimental settings.
The absence of common knowledge of rationality could have two effects on agent
behavior (a) because agents do not know the decision rule being followed by other
agents, they are uncertain of the reservation demands of other agents in the negotia-
tions. This uncertainty can lead to offer failure which, in sequential negotiations which
only yield the economic rent if all negotiations are successful, is very costly. We call
this effect “response uncertainty.” Second agents who know that other agents are un-
certain whether they are Bayes rational may, even if they are Bayes rational, might
play strategies that aim to signal to other agents that they are not Bayes rational and
thereby profit from changing the best responses of the other agents. We call this effect
“signaling.” We argue, based both on specific structure of our game and the experi-
mental results, that “response uncertainty” is much more plausible explanation for our
results. In our game, a landowner can only signal toughness by rejecting a developer
offer and the only opportunity for the landowner to reap a reward from such signaling
is through raising the developer’s reservation threshold for accepting landowner coun-
teroffers. However, a rational developer’s threshold for accepting counteroffers is inde-
pendent of the developer’s beliefs about the toughness of the landowner in the current
negotiation and depends rather on the conjectured demands of landowners in prospec-
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tive negotiations. Thus, landowner signaling is a priori rather implausible. Developers
signaling by making very low offers in early negotiations is a priori plausible. However,
in the experiments very low offers were very infrequent and, in fact, developer offers
were on average overly generous. Thus, the signaling probably does not account for our
results.
Response uncertainty appears to be a more plausible explanation for the inefficiency
of the experimental bargaining. To investigate this the effect of response uncertainty,
we estimate a simple structural model of behavior and try to identify the effect of re-
sponse uncertainty on the outcomes of the experiment. Given the limited number of
observations, of necessity, in order to identify preference parameters on which such
uncertainty is founded, we are required to impose strong identifying restrictions. One
obvious source of uncertainty is uncertainty regarding the decision rule a given agent is
following. Agent following different decision rules can be thought of as different agent
“types.” Because of data limitations, we can only model a limited number of types.
Given that the earlier evidence strongly suggests that agents who do not play Bayes
rational strategies tend to follow strategies that approximate the even-split strategy, our
empirical model incorporates two agent types–Bayes rational, and even-split. Intro-
ducing these two types generates “type uncertainty.” Although even-split and Bayes
rational strategies roughly correspond to typical offers, most offers were not perfectly
consistent with either Bayes rational or even-split behavior. Thus, even if an agent
perfectly identified other agents’ type, that agent could not predict other agents’ deci-
sions certainty. To incorporate uncertain responses given type, which we call “type-
conditioned uncertainty,” as well as type uncertainty, we employ the following stylized
but parsimonious empirical parameterization. Let R˜at , a ∈ {Developer,Landowner},
t ∈ {Rational,Even-split} represent the reservation demands of landowners and devel-
opers conditioned on their type, which is assumed to be either rational Bayesian (Ratio-
nal) or even-split (Even split). Similarly let O˜at represent the offers made by landowners
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and developers. We assume that
R˜at = r
a
t (1+σ z˜
a
t ) , z˜
a
t
dist.
= Normal[0,1] (3)
O˜at = o
a
t (1+σ w˜
a
t ) , w˜
a
t
dist.
= Normal[0,1] (4)
where the standard normal variates, w˜at and z˜
a
t are jointly independent. o
a
t (r
a
t ) represents
the predicted offer (reservation) price of a type t agent. The predicted behavior for a
Bayes rational agent is given by the analysis in Section 2.2. The predicted behavior
of an even-split agent is o = r = 1/(n+ 1). Landowner accept offers from developers
that at least equal R. Developers accept counteroffers by landowners which are no
greater than R. Using this parameterization, type-conditioned uncertainty is represented
by σ . To introduce uncertainty concerning type, we estimate the fraction α ∈ (0,1),
which represents the fraction of agents that follow the even split strategy. The model is
estimated using the maximum likelihood method.
Table 8 shows the results from this maximum likelihood estimates. The estimate
of the fraction of even-split players, α , is 0.685, indicating that a large fraction of the
players are even-split players. The estimate of σ is 0.274. This shows that the variation
is quite large. The maximum likelihood tests indicate that a significant degree of prefer-
ence heterogeneity. Both preference heterogeneity and type-conditioned uncertainty are
required to rationalize our results. The fairly high estimated fraction of players who are
even-split types rationalizes the fairly “unaggressive” offers and counteroffers observed
in the experiment—developer offers to landowners usually exceeded the rational Nash
offer and counteroffers to developers were much lower than the rational Nash coun-
teroffer. If in fact, a large fraction of players are even-split types, then aggressive offers
will trigger rejection. Thus, in such an environment, even a rational Nash type will
moderate his offers. However, the presence of even split players per se cannot explain
offer failure. To see this note that if α ≈ 1 and σ ≈ 0, then the equilibrium will call
for rational Nash players to make even split offers. Such offers will be accepted with
probability close to 1 and the solution to the game will be quite efficient. However when
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σ is large, the marginal cost, in terms of offer rejection from demanding more than the
even-split solution will be attenuated and rational types will thus have an incentive to
make offers which might trigger rejection. At the same time, type-conditioned pref-
erence uncertainty, alone, cannot explain the unaggressive offer pattern. To see this,
note that as type-conditioned uncertainty grows, the marginal effect of the size of an
agents demands on the probability that the demands will be accepted falls. This leads
to more, not less aggressive offers. In order to fit the two pervasive features of the
results–unaggressive offers and a high probability of failure–both type heterogeneity
and type-conditioned uncertainty are required. Thus, the results of the maximum like-
lihood estimation, which finds strong evidence for both, should not be too surprising.11
<<COMP: Place Table 8 about here>>
7 Outcomes of the TC-O game
7.1 Basic results
We conducted 60 games with TC-O mechanism. 39 of these games, 65%, succeed
without any inefficient dissipation. This success rate is much higher that the success
rate in SC-P games, 41%. Table 9 Panel A presents the payoff for the developer and
landowners in all TC-O games and in all successful TC-O games. On average, the
developer captures close to 25% of the surplus and the landowners collectively cap-
ture around 40%, 35% is dissipated. In fact, the ratio between average developer and
landowner surplus capture is within the rather narrow range of surplus divisions sup-
ported by subgame perfect Nash equilibria of TC-O. The major deviation from the equi-
librium predicted surplus allocations in the TC-O is inefficiency losses which are still
high, although much lower than in the SC-P. In fact, conditioned on an efficient solution
being reached, the observed average surplus division, 38% to the developer, is within
the range of surplus allocations to the developer, 37%–40% that can be supported by
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subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
Table 9 Panel B presents the offers made by the developer in the initial tender offer
phase. The average of all 180 offers in the tender offer phase is 14.9%, well below
the minimum rationalizable offer. The developers make the same offer to all three
land owners in 33 of the 60 games. The average offer in same-offer games is 12.9%
and the average offer in the different-offer games is higher, 17.3%. In the sequential
phase shown in Panel C, we aggregate negotiations based on how many negotiations
remaining using the variables NR2, NR1 and NR0. A negotiation is aggregated into
NRi if there are i remaining negotiations which must be successfully concluded for the
property transfer to occur. Although our analysis shows that the number of remaining
negotiations should be positively associated with developer offers, the association is
negative in the experiments. For example, the average developer offer for NR2 negoti-
ations is 17.9%, while the average for NR0 negotiations is 21.1%. No developer offers
more than the rational equilibrium offer (13 of the residual value) when there is either
one landowner or two landowners remaining to be negotiated. In contrast, in the final
negotiation when there is no landowner to be negotiated, 75% of the offers are above
the rational equilibrium offers. Moreover, NR2 and NR1 contain one offer each that
exceeds the even-split of 25%, while NR0 contains six such offers.
<<COMP: Place Table 9 about here>>
Table 10 summarizes the acceptance decision of the landowners. In the initial
tender-offer phase, a majority of offers (80.6%) are rejected. The average rejected offer
is 14.2%; the average accepted offer is 17.8%. About 21% of offers are equal or above
the symmetric Nash equilibrium offer of 20%, and 44.7% of such offers are accepted.
87% of the remaining offers are rejected. None of the tender offers equals or exceeds
the even-split level of 25%. On average, developers made low offers in the initial tender
offer phase and these offers are typically rejected. In the sequential continuation phase,
developers offer more than in the initial tender offer phase, which is consistent with the
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Nash best-reply behavior, and increase their offers as the game progresses through the
sequential negotiations, which is not consistent with Nash best-reply behavior.
<<COMP: Place Table 10 about here>>
7.2 Potential explanations for results
Developers frequently appear to use the initial tender-offer phase to exploit naive landown-
ers. For example, 10% of the tender offers are less than 5%, and about 30% of the offers
are less than 15%. This strategy is moderately effective: out of the twenty offers below
5%, 5% were accepted. 10% of the offers below 15% are accepted. However, it is not
clear if this strategy is optimal even in the presences of some naive landowners. As the
solution to the TC-O mechanism developed in Section 3.2 shows, developer payoffs in
subgames in which landowners hold out are lower than the developer’s payoff when
all landowners accept optimal tender offers. Acceptance of the tender offer by one
landowner commits value to that landowner and thus has a positive externality. From
the developer’s perspective, taking value “off-the-table” in subsequent negotiations re-
duces the reservation demands of other landowners. Thus, making low offers that are
likely to be rejected by rational landowners is costly and perhaps developers did not
factor in this cost when fixing their tender offers. Or perhaps they believe that the prob-
ability that the landowners are naive is so large that this cost is more than compensated
by the benefit of “fishing” for naive landowners.
Turning to landowner responses, in Table 11, we use logistic regressions to study
which factors contribute to the landowners’ accept/reject decision. Panel A is for initial
tender offer phase, and Panel B is for continuation phase. We first consider symmetric
tender offers. First, We regress acceptance decision on OFFER, a variable represent-
ing the level of the developer’s tender offer. Next, we include an aditional dummy
variable, RATIONAL, which equals one if the offer is equal to or above the symmet-
ric Nash equilibrium offer of 20%. We see the coefficient for OFFER is positive and
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highly significant in the first regression. This shows that landowners take offer level into
consideration for their acceptance decision. Note that after the RATIONAL dummy is
included, the only significant coefficient is for the RATIONAL dummy. This shows that
landowners respond to the offer level in a nonlinear fashion, accepting with high prob-
ability as long as the offer at least equals the symmetric Nash equilibrium tender offer.
This non-linear response is consistent with best response behavior because accepting
an offer if and only if it exceeds 20% is the equilibrium landowner response in a Nash
symmetric equilibrium. Thus, while developer offers are for the most part too low to
be consistent with equilibrium predictions in the initial tender offer phase, landowner
responses in the initial tender offer phase are much more consistent.
When developers make asymmetric tender offers, we find that our models have
much less predictive power. Given different landowners receive different tender offers,
we can consider the effect of offer asymmetry. We use the variable MAX, which equals
one if no landowner received a higher tender offer. For asymmetric offers, we report
two regression results: One with OFFER only, and one with OFFER and MAX. While
OFFER is marginally significant by itself, the significance goes to MAX when MAX is
included. In unreported work, We also run regression with OFFER and RATIONAL, but
RATIONAL is not significant. On possible interpretation of this result, is that landown-
ers, who are ex ante symmetric, believe that asymmetric tender offers are unfair and
thus reject such offers even if in absolute terms the offers are not particularly low. We
next combine all tender offers and report two regressions. The first one includes OF-
FER, RATIONAL and MAX. In this case, only RATIONAL is significant. The second
regression includes two variables, MEANOFFER and DIFFMEAN. MEANOFFER is
the average of the three tender offers, and DIFFMEAN is the difference between the
tender offer and MEANOFFER. The aim of this regression is to capture both the over-
all offer level and its asymmetry. As shown in the table, only MEANOFFER is positive
and significant. DIFFMEAN is positive but insignificant.
In Table 11 Panel B, we present the results for the offers in the continuation phase.
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The first regression includes OFFER, the level of the offer, the dummy variable MAX
which equals to one if the offer is no lower than any of the tender offers and previous
sequential offers. The motivation for this variable is that a landowner might refuse
to accept an offer that is less than previous offers. We run this regression separately
for NR2, NR1 and NR0. OFFER is significantly positive in NR2 and NR1, but MAX
is insignificant in all regressions. In the next regression, we include OFFER and the
dummy variable RATIONAL, which equals one if the offer at least equals the minimum
offer in any Nash equilibrium. We only run this regression for NR0 because there
are no offers that clear the rational lower bound in NR2 or NR1. In this case, none
of the variables is significant although the sign of OFFER is in the predicted positive
direction. Finally, we run two regressions using all offers in the continuation phase. The
first includes OFFER, MAX and RATIONAL. The second replaces RATIONAL with
RESIDUAL, the residual value when the developer makes the offer, since the rational
offer is 13 of RESIDUAL. In both regressions, only OFFER is positive and significant.
Other variables are insignificant.
<<COMP: Place Table 11 about here>>
In summary, landowner responses to symmetric developer tender offers are fairly
consistent with the Nash equilibrium prediction. Developer offers were significantly
lower, on average, than predicted and landowner and developer actions in the sequential
negotiations are less consistent with equilibrium predicted behavior. The most salient
deviation from the Nash prediction was the low average level of developer offers. De-
viations from equilibrium behavior result large inefficiencies relative to efficient equi-
librium outcomes. However, conditioned on an efficient agreement being reached, the
average division of the surplus between the developer and landowners is in the narrow
range of surplus divisions supportable by Nash equilibria. Moreover, the overall level
of inefficiency was much less than under the SC-P mechanism.
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8 Conclusions
The first and most obvious conclusion form our results is that, even in perfect settings,
bargaining efficiency is problematic and dependent on negotiation mechanisms, even
when the equilibrium solutions of the mechanisms are equally efficient. This obser-
vation suggests that specific bargaining mechanisms matter for attaining efficient out-
comes but not for the reasons suggested in the classical implementation literature. Our
first game, SC-P, was a game of perfect information with a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium. The outcome of this equilibrium was fully efficient. However, when im-
plemented in the laboratory it produced extremely inefficient bargaining and virtually
eliminated the gain from initiating value increasing property-right transfers. In contrast,
the TC-O game, designed to overcome behavioral obstacles to efficient contracting, was
a game of imperfect information with multiple equilibria. Yet when deployed in the lab-
oratory, it produced far more efficient bargaining. Thus, real-world investment in costly
legal technology and costly structured bargaining mechanisms may not be motivated by
the need to overcome asymmetric information or moral hazard problems but rather be
evolutionary adaption to behavioral biases.12
Second, our results provide a rationale for investing resources in designing new ne-
gotiation and contracting mechanisms and empirically validating the efficiency of stan-
dard contracts and structured negotiation procedures. Legal innovation can increase
bargaining efficiency even in the absence of “market imperfections” such as moral haz-
ard and asymmetric information. Thus, our analysis predicts that rather complex le-
gal mechanisms will evolve for handling value-increasing property rights reallocations
which involve multiple parties even when the parties are all equally well informed about
the surplus generated.
Third, our results suggest why private negotiations fail. In our experiments, the key
driver of negotiation failure appears to be lack of common knowledge of rationality and
preferences of other agents. This driver has first-order importance even in a labora-
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tory setting were the experimenter endows agents with clear and transparent rewards
and structures the bargaining problem in a very stylized and simple fashion. While
agent irrationality can produce failure under any bargaining mechanism, mechanisms
vary with respect to the degree to which rational agents optimal strategies are depen-
dent on their estimates of the rationality of other agents and with respect to the costs
rational agents must bear to adjust their demands to accommodate the irrationality of
other agents. Thus reducing the dependence of rational best responses on conjectured
behavior of other agents and increasing the action space in a way that permits rational
agents to make offers that simultaneously satisfy the reservation demands both of other
rational agents and agents with fairness and/or rank-based preferences should generally
increase efficiency.
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Notes
1For example, see [Rubinstein, 1985].
2See, for example Cooter [1982] and Furusawa and Wen [2003]
3Both the law and the legal literature on insolvency has drawn a sharp distinction
between executory and non-executory contracts. For example in U.S. insolvency law, a
debtor-in-possession (or a bankruptcy trustee) has the right to decide whether to perform
contractual obligations under an executory contract (“assuming the contract”) or refuse
to perform (“rejecting the contract”)[Countryman, 1972].
4Hobbes [1983, Chapt. II-X] argues that, in the state of nature, agreements become
enforceable as soon as one party performs on the agreement. Until such time, either
party can justly repudiate the agreement because, absent an enforcement system, each
party can legitimately doubt whether the other party will ever perform. In our setting,
the developer paying the agreed purchase price constitutes performance and would ob-
ligate a self-interested but prudent Hobbsian landowner to surrender title.
5I.e., the sequential cash purchase game is a game of perfect information. The game
has a unique sub-game perfect equilibria that produces an efficient outcome. In fact, the
subgame perfect equilibrium equals the unique strategy that remains after the elimina-
tion of weakly dominated strategies.
6For example, Gomes [2005] consider contracts that may impose externalities on
other agents. Genicot and Ray [2006] show that, in the presence of externalities, mul-
tiagent negotiations may fail. Caruana et al. [2007] model the effect of exogenous
deadlines. Marx and Shaffer [2010] consider sequential negotiations with breakup fees;
Horn and Wolinsky [1988] consider the effect of coalition formation; Cai [2000] con-
siders the effect of allowing agents who fail to reach agreement in one negotiation to
reenter negotiations at a later date; Noe and Wang [2004] consider sequential nego-
tiations when the outcomes of earlier negotiations are unknown to parties later in the
sequence.
7See also Croson and Johnston [2000] and Aivazian et al. [2009] for similar collec-
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tive decision experiments.
8 After obtaining permission from Institutional Review Board and following the
Board’s requirement, we have put advertisements in both graduate and undergraduate
business schools in two different locations to look for potential subjects.
9See the online supplement for the instruction sheet, decision tree, and computer
screen shots.
10See Camerer [2003] for a survey of the results of ultimatum experiments.
11One limitation related to the normal distribution assumption of uncertainty in the
empirical model is that reservation values less than 0 or greater than 1 and offers less
than 0 or greater than 1 are possible. This is particularly a problem for counteroffers in
the second and third negotiations, where the predicted rational Nash counteroffer is one
or close to one. For this reason, as well as estimating the model for all decisions, we
also estimated the model excluding counteroffers and developer replies to counteroffers.
The estimated parameters in the restricted model and the unrestricted model are quite
similar.
12For an example of costly mechanisms that restrict the order and timing of agent
moves, see Betker [1997] for an analysis of Chapter 11 bankruptcy costs.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary of Game Design
This table presents the summary of our game design. A, B, and C are all SC-P games.
A represents the game with 1 developer and 1 land owner; B represents the game with
1 developer and 2 land owners; C represents the game with 1 developer and 3 land
owners. D is TC-O game with 1 developer and 3 land owners.
Game Design by Session
Session No. of Game Sequence Practice
Participants Design Rounds
1 12 B-A-B B×4→A×4→B×12 first 4
2 12 A-B-A A×4→B×9→A×4→B×3 first 4
3 12 A-C-A A×4→C×12→A×4→C×3 first 4
4 12 C-A-C C×4→A×4→C×12 first 4
5 16 D D×19 first 4
Game Design by Treatment
Game Practice No. of No. of Groups No. of
Type Rounds Rounds per Round Games
A 8 16 6 96
B 4 24 4 96
C 4 27 3 81
D 4 15 4 60
Table 2: Summary of Negotiation Success in SC-P Games
This table presents the number of bilateral negotiations (N), successful ones (N Suc-
cess), failed ones (N Failure), and percent of failed negotiations (% Failure). N1, N2,
and N3 represent the first, second, and third negotiation, respectively.
N N Success N Failure % Failure
N1 81 52 29 36%
N2 52 39 13 25%
N3 39 33 6 15%
ALL 81 33 48 59%
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Table 3: Payoffs in SC-P Games
This table presents the means and standard deviations of the payoffs received by the
developer and landowners in three negotiations in all games and all successful games.
This table also presents the predicted payoffs in rational value-maximizing equilibrium
and sunk-cost/even-split equibrium.
All Games Successful Games Rational Sunk-cost Even-split
Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Equil. Equil.
Developer -0.011 0.218 0.174 0.065 0.296 0.400 0.250
Landowner 1 0.169 0.130 0.263 0.041 0.148 0.200 0.250
Landowner 2 0.133 0.140 0.279 0.022 0.222 0.200 0.250
Landowner 3 0.116 0.143 0.284 0.043 0.333 0.200 0.250
Table 4: Initial Offers in SC-P Games
This table presents the number (N) and average of initial offers made by the developer.
Standard deviations are in paratheses. The table also presents comparison of the initial
offers with predicted strategies in rational value-maximizing equilibrium and even-split
equilibrium. For each equilibrium, the table includes the predicted offer (Strategy), the
average of absolute errors between initial offers and predicted strategy (AbsErr) and
its standard deviation in paratheses, and the percent of initial offers that are acceptable
based on the equilibrium (NA). The table also presents the number and percent of initial
offers that are between the predicted strategies of two equilibria.
N Initial Rational Even-split In Between
Offer Strategy AbsErr NA Strategy AbsErr NA N Percent
N1 81 0.218 0.148 0.102 85.2% 0.250 0.055 45.7% 46 56.8%
(0.085) (0.041) (0.073)
N2 52 0.266 0.222 0.046 94.2% 0.250 0.026 76.9% 18 34.6%
(0.029) (0.025) (0.020)
N3 39 0.274 0.333 0.060 2.6% 0.250 0.041 82.1% 31 79.5%
(0.043) (0.042) (0.028)
ALL 172 0.245 0.076 69.2% 0.250 0.043 63.4% 95 55.2%
(0.069) (0.045) (0.054)
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Table 5: Acceptance Decision of Initial Offers in SC-P Games
This table presents the number (N), average (Mean), and standard deviation (in parathe-
ses) of initial offers that are accepted and rejected. The table also presents the percent
of acceptable offers (NA) based on two equilibria, rational value-maximizing equilib-
rium and even-split equilibrium. In addition, it provides the percent of acceptable offers
based on the equilibrium that are accepted (PA), and percent of rejectable offers based
on the equilibrium that are rejected (PR).
Accepted Rejected Rational Even-split
N Mean N Mean NA PA PR NA PA PR
N1 48 0.260 33 0.156 85.2% 69.6% 100.0% 45.7% 83.8% 61.4%
(0.037) (0.098)
N2 36 0.275 16 0.246 94.2% 71.4% 66.7% 76.9% 82.5% 75.0%
(0.026) (0.027)
N3 30 0.280 9 0.253 2.6% 100.0% 23.7% 82.1% 81.3% 42.9%
(0.043) (0.039)
ALL 114 0.270 58 0.196 69.2% 70.6% 43.4% 63.4% 82.6% 61.9%
(0.036) (0.089)
Table 6: Analysis of Counteroffers by Landowners in SC-P Games
This table presents the number (N), average (Mean), and standard deviation (in parathe-
ses) of counteroffers made by landowners. The table also provides the average absolute
errors of counteroffers from equilibrium strategies of rational value-maximizing equi-
librium, sunk-cost equilibrium, and even-split equilibrium. The standard deviations of
absolute errors are in paratheses. It also presents the percent of counteroffers that are
weakly disadvangeous (Disadv. Offers), that is, counteroffers that are less than or equal
to three times the initial offers.
N Counter AbsErr Disadv.
Offer Rational Sunk-cost Even-split Offers
N1 12 0.312 0.133 0.288 0.062 83.3%
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
N2 4 0.313 0.354 0.288 0.063 100.0%
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
N3 4 0.363 0.638 0.238 0.113 100.0%
(0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096)
ALL 20 0.322 0.278 0.278 0.072 90.0%
(0.057) (0.211) (0.057) (0.057)
Goswami
47
Table 7: Acceptance Decision of the Developer in SC-P Games
This table presents the number (N), average (Mean), and standard deviation (in parathe-
ses) of counteroffers that are accepted and rejected. The table also presents the per-
cent of acceptable counteroffers (NA) based on two equilibria, rational equilibrium and
sunk-cost equilibrium. In addition, it provides the percent of acceptable offers based
on the equilibrium that are accepted (PA), and percent of rejectable offers based on the
equilibrium that are rejected (PR).
Accepted Rejected Rational Even-split
N Mean N Mean NA PA PR NA PA PR
N1 4 0.300 8 0.318 100.0% 33.3% - 0.0% - 66.7%
(0.016) (0.056)
N2 3 0.300 1 0.350 100.0% 75.0% - 0.0% - 25.0%
(0.000) -
N3 3 0.317 1 0.500 100.0% 75.0% - 0.0% - 25.0%
(0.035) -
ALL 10 0.305 10 0.339 100.0% 50.0% - 0.0% - 50.0%
(0.021) (0.076)
Table 8: Maximum Likelihood Estimates in SC-P Games
This table presents the maximum likelihood estimates of landowner and developer of-
fers and offer responses assuming the agents play random responses drawn from a mix-
ture of offer/response distributions centered on two types of responses: rational Nash
and even-split. The parameter α represents the estimated probability of drawing from
the even-split distribution. The parameter σ represents the variance of actions condi-
tioned on type of response.
Parameter Standard
Estimate Error
α 0.685 0.036
σ 0.274 0.010
Nobs 471
LogL -387.4
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Table 9: Payoffs and Offers by the Developer in TC-O games
Panel A presents the means and standard deviations of the payoffs received by the de-
veloper and landowners in all games and all successful games. Panel B presents the
number (N) and average of initial simultaneous offers made by the developer. Panel
C also presents the number (N) of games that the developer makes the same simulta-
neous offers and its offer average, and the number of games that the developer makes
unequal simultaneous offers and its offer average. Panel C presents the number (N) and
average of initial offers in the sequential negotiations made by the developer. Standard
deviations are in paratheses. Panel B also presents comparison of the initial offers with
predicted strategies in rational value-maximizing equilibrium and even-split equibrium.
For each equilibrium, the table includes the predicted offer (Strategy), the average of
absolute errors between initial offers and predicted strategy (AbsErr) and its standard
deviation in paratheses, and the percent of initial offers that are acceptable based on the
equilibrium (NA). The table also presents the number and percent of initial offers that
are between the predicted strategies of two equilibria.
Panel A. Payoffs of Developers and Landowners
All Games All Successful Games
N=60 N=39
Mean StdDev Mean StdDev
Developer 0.248 0.191 0.381 0.067
Landowner 0.134 0.104 0.206 0.041
Panel B. Initial Tender Offers from Developers
All Offers Equal Offer Unequal Offer
Games Games
N Offer N Offer N Offer
Simul 180 0.149 33 0.129 27 0.173
(0.061) (0.068) (0.040)
Panel C. Developer Offers in the Sequential Continuation Phase
N Initial Rational Even-split In Between
Offer Strategy AbsErr NA Strategy AbsErr NA N Percent
NR2 35 0.179 0.333 0.155 0% 0.250 0.071 2.9% 1 2.9%
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
NR1 44 0.197 vary 0.073 0% 0.250 0.053 2.3% 1 2.3%
(0.037) (0.042) (0.037)
NR0 44 0.211 vary 0.028 75% 0.250 0.083 13.6% 34 77.3%
(0.028) (0.024) (0.086)
Goswami
49
Table 10: Acceptance Decision of Landowners in TC-O Games
This table presents the number (N), average (Mean), and standard deviation (in parathe-
ses) of initial offers (in both the tender offer phase and the sequential continuation
phase) that are accepted and rejected. The table also presents the percent of acceptable
offers (NA) based on two equilibria, rational value-maximizing equilibrium and even-
split equilibrium. In addition, it provides the percent of acceptable offers based on the
equilibrium that are accepted (PA), and percent of rejectable offers based on the equilib-
rium that are rejected (PR). For simultaneous offers, we use the symmetric equilibrium
offer of 0.2 as the rational equilibrium offer.
Accepted Rejected Rational Even-split
N Mean N Mean NA PA PR NA PA PR
Simul 35 0.178 145 0.142 21.1% 44.7% 87.3% 0% - 80.6%
(0.044) (0.062)
NR2 25 0.201 10 0.123 0% - 28.6% 2.9% 100% 29.4%
(0.025) (0.082)
NR1 33 0.207 11 0.165 0% - 25% 2.3% 100% 25.6%
(0.017) (0.060)
NR0 36 0.214 8 0.198 75% 84.8% 27.3% 13.6% 100% 21.1%
(0.029) (0.022)
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Table 11: Logistic Regression Results
This table presents logistic regression results on landowners’ acceptance decision. The
dependent variable equals one when the landowner accepts the offer. Panel A is for
initial offers, and Panel B is for offers in the sequential continuation phase. We report
the corresponding z-statistics in parenthesis. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance
at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level for a two-tailed test.
Dependent variable: landowner’s acceptance decision
Panel A. Initial Tender Offers
Symmetric Offers Non-symmetric Offers All Offers
OFFER 0.152 0.044 0.179 0.123 0.082
(2.50)** (0.69) (1.65)* (1.19) (1.50)
RATIONAL 2.087 1.110
(2.75)*** (2.03)**
MAX 0.999 0.400
(1.69)* (0.77)
MEANOFFER 0.142
(2.78)***
DIFMEAN 0.334
(1.34)
CONST -3.766 -2.739 -4.545 -3.981 -3.366 -3.753
(-3.64)*** (-3.09)*** (-2.25)** (-2.12)** (-3.32)*** (-4.13)***
N 99 99 81 81 180 180
Pseudo R2 0.097 0.186 0.044 0.079 0.112 0.073
Panel B. Offers in the Sequential Continuation Phase
NR2 NR1 NR0 All Offers
OFFER 0.911 0.587 0.213 0.207 0.311 0.302
(1.99)** (1.90)* (1.20) (1.09) (2.93)*** (3.12)***
MAX -9.330 0.888 -0.194 -0.130 -0.138
(-1.55) (0.76) (-0.15) (-0.16) (-0.17)
RATIONAL -0.095 -0.266
(-0.08) (-0.43)
RESIDUAL -0.004
(-0.51)
CONST -7.238 -11.174 -2.741 -2.699 -4.647 -4.332
(-1.85)* (-1.86)* (-0.89) (-0.80) (-2.62)*** (-2.64)***
N 35 44 44 44 123 123
Pseudo R2 0.398 0.255 0.052 0.051 0.191 0.192
